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Technologies of Risk? Regulating Online
Investing in Canada*

MARY CONDON

This paper places the development of regulatory strategies dealing with
the growth of online investing in Canada in the context of theoretical debates
about governance through risk. It examines aspects of this emerging regulation
relating to (i) use of the Internet by issuers for document delivery; (ii)
application of investment suitability rules to online trading; (iii) emergence of
new electronic- trading markets. These regulatory developments are
considered in terms of the extent to which they exhibit features suggesting: (a)
an increased decentring of the state; (b) a shift to risk governance as an
end of regulating. The paper argues for the need to pay careful attention to
the politics of decentring and risk governance in assessing the emerging
regulation of online investing.

I. INTRODUCTION

Online investing is arguably the quintessential “new economy” activity,
involving as it does the marriage of information and technology in pursuit
of what Castells calls “informational capitalism” (Castells 2000: 161). While
*
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the demise of the new economy has been proclaimed by many (Economy
and Society 2001), there are still compelling reasons to pay attention to the
issue of the regulation of online investing, not least of which is the
possibility for retail investors to lose money through the use of
technological tools that are not widely understood (Bradley 2004). As
detailed in this volume, a number of jurisdictions around the world have
addressed aspects of online investing over the last few years. One of the
objectives of this paper is to describe Canadian forays into this ﬁeld of
securities regulation, for comparative purposes. In the Ontario context1
regulators have attended to the online activities of those who issue
securities for trading (issuers), but have focused more intensively on the
consequences of online investing for both the broker/investor relationship
and for the markets for trading themselves. These regulatory developments
will be described in Parts III and IV of the paper. However, these examples
of regulatory change also offer the opportunity to consider some timely
questions about the nature of regulation in the neo-liberal state. Part II of
this paper charts the theoretical ground to be brought to bear on
understanding the regulation of online investing in Canada.

II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The “new economy” of the last several decades held out the promise of
using technology to transform the way business was done throughout the
economy. As Castells puts it, “the new economy is/will be predicated on a

surge in productivity growth resulting from the ability to use new
information technology in powering a knowledge-based production
system” (Castells 2000: 161). The emphasis in the new economy was on
innovation, networking, entrepreneurialism, and competition. Critical
commentators have noted that these developments have not been without
social cost, in the form of more contingent and insecure labor markets,
along with increased social inequality and exclusion (ibid.). In the speciﬁc
context of capital markets, ﬁnance was transformed by the liberalization of
rules relating to the types of ﬁnancial transactions that could be
conducted within ﬁrms, as well as the possibility of more broadly based
banking, insurance, and securities transactions. Information technology
itself also changed the complexity of, and manner in which, ﬁnancial
transactions could be conducted and the types of ﬁnancial products that
could be sold. As Caroline Bradley notes, information about securities
trading opportunities and about the business entities issuing those securities
is now available more immediately and arguably in a more user-friendly
manner than in the pre-Internet era (Bradley 2004).
If the “new economy” is one metanarrative purporting to describe the
reconﬁguration of social and economic space in the late twentieth and early
twenty-ﬁrst century, another is the so-called “risk society” thesis. In Ulrich
Beck’s ﬁrst account of the risk society (Beck 1992: 19) he proposed that “in
advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically
accompanied by the social production of risks. Accordingly, the problems
and conﬂicts relating to distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the
problems and conﬂicts that arise from the production, deﬁnition, and

distribution of techno-scientiﬁcally produced risks,” whether the problem
is, for example, BSE or global warming. In this account, technology creates
as many problems as the opportunities it enables. For Beck, “the discourse
of risk begins where trust in our security and belief in progress ends”
(Beck 2000: 213). Thus, the future, more than the past, becomes “the
cause of present-day experience and action.” Individuals become oriented
towards governing themselves so as to avoid potential future risks, such as
disease or poverty in old age. As Dean has pointed out, analysts have
taken two approaches to the study of risk as it relates to modern society.
One approach, exempliﬁed by Beck, is to understand risk as a “feature
of the ontological condition of humans” (Dean 1999: 178) within
modernity. The other is to address it as a “governmental rationality”
(ibid.: 176), that is a discourse and set of practices connected to the
“regulation, management and shaping of human conduct” (ibid.: 178).
From this vantage point, attention might be paid to what Rose calls “an
industry of risk,” for whom the characterizing and subsequent assuaging
of fears for the future is a proﬁt opportunity (Rose 1999). Furthermore,
in this second account, risk as a technique for the governance of
populations is congruent with the political project of neo-liberalism,
which emphasizes individual responsibility, entrepreneurship, the preeminence of markets, and the withdrawal

of the state from the

provision of various forms of social insurance and various interventions
in the economy (Condon 2002; Ericson & Haggerty 1997; McCluskey
2002). Making this connection between risk governance

and neo-

liberalism also allows us to see that in actual examples of governance

through risk, what is at issue is the material distribution of risks in
particular ways (Condon 2002; McCluskey 2002).
What is the place of law and regulation in these socio-economic
metanarratives? There is now some consensus in the literature on neoliberal practices in various jurisdictions that attempts at deregulation,
supposed to result from a neo-liberal agenda, often led in fact to speciﬁc
forms of reregulation (Braithwaite 2000: 204). For example, despite the
fact that online investing can contribute to neo-liberal goals, such as
increasing competition among suppliers of trading platforms or allowing
individual investors to prepare for retirement more autonomously, the
enterprise is being regulated in many jurisdictions. It has been argued
that the general form that this re-regulation has taken has been a shift
away from models of command and control via a central state apparatus
(Black 2001). What is tending to replace this is regulation accomplished
using contractual arrangements, codes of conduct, self-regulation, and other
more low visibility (and compliance-oriented) mechanisms, that is, so-called
decentered regulation.2 This development raises a number of important
questions, not least of which is, as pursued by Kingsford Smith (2004),
the implications of the shift to decentered regulation for traditional
notions of accountability to the rule of law. Given the claims of the
metanarrative of governance through risk, it is also worth addressing more
precisely the connection, if any, between governance through risk and
decentered regulation. To what extent have regulatory forms in speciﬁc
ﬁelds empirically begun to shift to a discourse of governance through risk
(Condon 2002)? Relatedly, does the phenomenon of decentered regulation

consequent on the dismantling of traditional state mechanisms for
regulating in fact presage a change in the ends as well as the means of
regulating? Connected to this is the extent to which the phenomenon of
decentered regulation changes the terms of debate about the formation of
speciﬁc regulatory approaches to dealing with novel issues, such as the
growth of online investing. Such debate, in a command and control
context, has traditionally investigated the role of private or public
interests in explaining the outcomes of state regulatory policy or
rulemaking (Condon 1998; Hawkins & Thomas 1989; Scott 2001).
However, a critique of the “governing at a distance” perspective, which
argues for deemphasizing the role of the state in accomplishing the
governance of populations (Rose 1999), is that it does not pay enough
attention to “politics, contestation and implementation” in explaining the
formation of speciﬁc regulatory initiatives (Callinicos 1999; O’Malley,
Weir & Shearing 1997). For example, is risk governance a feature of
the terms in which debate about the formation of regulatory codes for
governing online investing is conducted? The examples of policy and rule
formation in the area of online investing discussed below can be used to
illuminate

these

questions

about

decentered

regulation

and

risk

governance.

III. INVESTORS, ISSUERS, AND BROKERS

The take-up of online investing opportunities in Canada appears never to
have been as vigorous as in the U.S., certainly in those heady days a few

years ago when Internet trading looked like it might rival the popularity of
conventional trading. The Toronto Stock Exchange’s (now the TSX)
Canadian Shareowners Study for 2000 indicated that Canadian shareholders
were “tapping into the Internet at a rapid rate and see the Internet as a
crucial source for investment information. For the growing number of
people who have tried on-line trading, it has become the overwhelming
method of choice” (Market Probe Canada 2000). More speciﬁcally, the
TSX also reported that 11 percent of shareowners had conducted on-line
trades in that year. When the TSX study was updated in 2002, it was
reported that although there has been an overall decrease in share
ownership in Canada for the ﬁrst time in twenty years, that “(t)he Internet
continues to become a more prevalent means for shareowners to obtain
information and conduct transactions, and for many has replaced more
conventional channels and become the method of choice.” The study
went on to predict, however, that “future growth of this medium . . .
[would] be more gradual than it has been” (Market Probe Canada 2002).
Meanwhile, as Bradley (2004) notes the ofﬁcial regulatory line on
technological developments and the information economy is to describe
them as “providing investors with empowerment” although investors are
also cautioned to “understand the difference between investing and
gambling” (Wetston 1999). Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) ViceChair Wetston argued that technology can help reduce the “discrepancy in
the information available to large and small investors” and online trading
“lowers costs to investors and opens up trading to more investors”
(ibid.). On the other hand, “it may fool inexperienced or small investors

into believing they can “play with the big guys.” In particular, Wetston
expressed a concern that the “reliance invited by the securities industry
when it holds itself out to consumers as primarily an advice provider
should be matched by an appropriate level of accountability and
responsibility.” The investor education section of the OSC’s own website
includes a number of information sheets on the subject of Internet
investing, on the topics of investment information and scams, as well as
how-to guides. When addressing retail investors directly, the regulatory
approach is clearly to alert investors to the risks involved in using the
Internet for obtaining information or trading.3 Is the investor-oriented riskbased

approach

maintained

in

policy

discussions

concerning

the

investor/broker relationship and alternative markets for trading securities?
This issue will be taken up below by examining regulatory initiatives in
relation to issuers, brokers, and marketplaces.

A. REGULATION OF ISSUERS

National Policies (NP) 11–201 and 47–201 were effected in December 1999,
with the objective of providing guidance to issuers and registrants about the
approach that would be taken by the Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA) to the use of the Internet to satisfy various document disclosure and
delivery requirements. It is a staple of many regimes of securities regulation
that the initial issuance of securities to investors should be accompanied by
detailed information about the nature of the securities, the business entity
issuing them and its ﬁnancial status, as well as the “risk factors” involved in

investing in that enterprise.4 National Policy 11–201 supports the electronic
delivery of such documents provided certain requirements are satisﬁed.
These revolve around notice of delivery to the recipient, easy access of the
recipient to the document, the deliverer being able to show that the
document was delivered, and the non-corruption of the document in the
delivery process. The CSA indicates that most of these requirements may
be satisﬁed by the deliverer obtaining the prior consent of the intended
recipient to electronic delivery. A deliverer may effect electronic delivery
without consent, but does so “at the risk of bearing a more difﬁcult
evidentiary burden of proving that the ﬁrst three components of
electronic delivery were satisﬁed” (Notice of National Policy 11–201,
§2.1(5)). Also, reference to a third-party provider of the document will
likely “not constitute valid delivery in the absence of consent.”5 The CSA
was originally hostile to the use of hyperlinks in relation to electronic
delivery of a prospectus (ibid.), but in the ﬁnal form of the policy it is
content to note the risks involved for the issuer in using hyperlinks
(including the fact that it becomes liable for the accuracy of hyperlinked
material) along with the suggestion that care should be taken by the issuer
to ensure that recipients are clear which of

the documents being

delivered constitute the prospectus. All of this is taken by commentators as
evidence that the CSA is reluctant to move away from a restrictive stance
of “regulating by analogy” to paper in the context of document delivery
(Anand 2001). OSC Vice-Chair Wetston said in an April 2000 speech that,
“These policies were deliberately not formulated as a rule in order to give
market participants ﬂexibility about how they would use electronic means

for delivery and distribution” (Wetston 2000). The approach, therefore, is a
familiar one in Canadian securities regulation, whereby the state regulator
is involved in establishing general guidelines, but room for maneuver is
still exercisable by issuers, for example, in how to “take care” in
delineating the scope of the prospectus.
National Policy 47–201 deals with two further matters relating to the use
of the Internet in connection with trades and distributions in securities.
These are: (i) how use of the Internet impacts on jurisdictional questions;
and (ii) the approach to be taken to the conduct of “roadshows”6 over the
Internet. The explicit premise of this Policy is that “statutory requirements
should not change as a result of the involvement of the Internet” (National
Policy 47–201). In relation to the ﬁrst issue, a “prominent disclaimer” and
“reasonable precautions” will sufﬁce to avoid the jurisdiction of the OSC.
With respect to the latter, roadshows are acceptable, as long as they are
conducted similarly to the procedure for a non-Internet roadshow. This
includes the stricture that everyone receiving a transmission must have
received a preliminary prospectus, access to a transmission should be
controlled, and all viewers should agree not to reproduce the transmission.
Meanwhile, in relation to secondary market disclosure by issuers (i.e.,
post-initial issue of the securities), in May 2001 the CSA proposed
introducing a new National Policy dealing with disclosure standards,
which has now been adopted in Ontario. The impetus for this policy was
regulatory concern about the issue of selective disclosure of information
by

issuers

to analysts,

institutional

investors,

and

other

market

participants, which was perceived to pose “a serious threat to investor

conﬁdence in the fairness and integrity of the capital markets” (Request
for Comments 2001: 3301). A further speciﬁc purpose of the policy is to
“assist companies in managing their disclosure obligations and minimize
the risk of breaching securities law by

highlighting

some

risky

disclosure practices” (Notice of National Policy 51–201: 4460). Again,
the objective is to “outline what we consider to be good disclosure
practices, not to impose regulatory requirements” (ibid.: 4461). The CSA
explicitly compares its policy initiative to the terms of Regulation Fair
Dealing (FD) promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in the U.S. Canadian securities legislation contains a speciﬁc
prohibition against tipping, which is where someone in a “special
relationship” with the reporting issuer informs anyone of a material fact
or material change about the issuer before that material information has
been “generally disclosed.” The policy indicates that posting information
on a company website will not by itself satisfy the “generally disclosed”
requirement because Internet access is not yet sufﬁciently widespread and
because information thus posted to a website is not “effectively ‘pushed’
out to the marketplace” as opposed to investors seeking it for
themselves (ibid.). The only entity that commented on this aspect of the
proposed policy was a major Canadian law ﬁrm, McCarthy Tetrault, which
disputed the viability of a distinction drawn in the policy between open
conference calls accessible by the Internet (which would satisfy the
“generally disclosed” requirement) and postings to an issuer’s website
(which would not satisfy the requirement) (ibid.: 4480). The CSA
defended this distinction by concluding that the former involved active

dissemination because it would be preceded by a “broadly circulated news
release containing particulars of the call and the matters to be discussed,”
whereas a website posting would not involve such active dissemination.
This was despite the law ﬁrm’s argument that technology could alert
interested parties as to when information was posted on an issuer’s website
(ibid.: 4481).
Despite some level of ﬂexibility accorded to issuers in relation to how
they fulﬁl the requirements of these provisions, it is clear that the state
regulators are still engaging in a certain amount of gatekeeping on
behalf of investors. The distribution of risk as between issuers and
investors implicit in these policies is also affected by the background
condition that in Canada investors can still not easily sue issuers for
misrepresentations in documents provided to the market beyond the
moment of initial issue of the securities (i.e., in the so-called secondary
trading market).

B. REGULATION OF BROKERS

Like the U.S., Canada has experienced the development of discount and
online brokerage services, which have the capacity, as Vice-Chair Wetston
acknowledged, to transform “the traditional broker–customer relationship
as well as ma(k)e investors out of people with no previous experience or
real understanding of the stock market” (Wetston 2000). Not surprisingly,
the scale of online brokerage activity is much smaller in Canada than in the
U.S. Currently, there are some fourteen online brokerage ﬁrms in Canada,

mostly owned by Canadian banks, though Etrade has a Canadian subsidiary.7
Deutsche Bank has an ownership interest in an online brokerage called
Qtrade. In 2001 the CSA took action against three U.S. online brokers,
Datek, Ameritrade, and TD Waterhouse (U.S.), who executed trades on
U.S. markets for Canadian residents without being registered to trade
in Canada. Each agreed to pay Cdn$800,000, to seek registration and to
forthwith comply with the “gatekeeper and know your client obligations”
of Canadian securities regulation.8 The CSA asserted its jurisdiction in these
matters despite the fact that no complaints were made by customers resident
in Canada concerning their accounts.
As in other places, the big regulatory development in relation to the
impact of technology on broker activities has to do with the pressure to
downgrade the obligations to be fulﬁlled by brokers in dealing with online
clients. This issue is clearly connected to questions of the distribution of the
risk of making investments as between investors and their advisors. The
Canadian path to the removal of suitability requirements for the execution
of online trades was inﬂuenced, as usual, by developments in the U.S., but also
by speciﬁc Canadian concerns about the continued viability of the domestic
brokerage industry. In 1997 the CSA proposed a new National Instrument,
primarily intended to deal with the operation of toll-free lines and electronic
trading of securities, particularly mutual funds, by ﬁnancial institutions
(Notice of Proposed National Instrument 33 –103). This was originally sparked
by regulatory concern about conducting securities activities within retail
ofﬁces of banks and trust companies. However, the scope of the proposal
was not limited to the sale of mutual funds nor to trades by dealers related

to ﬁnancial institutions. The proposal purported to permit electronic
trading of securities by registered dealers, provided that the system “does
not accept transactions outside the suitability range for the client
established by the dealer” and referred elsewhere “any order to purchase
or sell securities outside the suitability range.” This proposal obviously
suggests a reluctance to move away from reliance on suitability assessments
made by dealers.
In October 1998, a submission was made to the regulators by a group of ten
Canadian discount brokerages, including all of the bank-owned ones,
requesting that a “process of regulatory change to limit the application
of

the

suitability rule only to brokers who provide advice or

recommendations to customers” be initiated (Bank of Montreal Investor
Services et al. 1998: 1). Note that the initiative for reform of the regulatory
code here was taken by the intermediaries themselves. The arguments
made in support of this proposition were formulated in terms of issues
such as the need for consistency with U.S. rules, the nature of “regulatory
and judicial trends” in the U.S. and Australia in support of such a move,
the costs of compliance, and the associated disadvantage to Canadian
brokers and stock exchanges in competing with counterparts in the U.S.
The submission noted that commissions charged by Canadian discount
brokers generally tended to be higher than those charged by their
counterparts in the U.S., a source of “numerous inquiries” from customers.
It argued that a customer who selects a discount broker has “implicitly
made a suitability self-determination and implicitly indicated that he or
she does not wish to pay for a suitability determination” (ibid.: 10).

These pressures, it was argued, were exacerbated by the growth of
electronic trading, such that if brokers in Canada failed to “keep pace with
their counterparts in the United States, Canadian customers may turn to
brokerages in the United States.” The group proposed a number of
procedural safeguards if their request was met with a favorable response,
including advance notiﬁcation to customers that they would not be
receiving advice or recommendations in connection with trades, and that
customers who wished to maintain a full-service account would be able to
do so, “provided that the accounts be maintained within separate divisions
and appropriate safeguards implemented” (ibid.: 12).
The CSA responded to this request in April 2000, when it announced
that relief from suitability requirements would be granted on an application
basis to dealers who only provided trade execution services for their clients
(CSA 2000: 2683). Several conditions were imposed “in order . . . to
safeguard the interests of investors,” which included the setting-up of a
separate entity offering execution-only services. Furthermore, individuals
were not to be compensated on the basis of the value of the transaction,
and the dealer must obtain from the client an “informed acknowledgement”
that no advice or recommendation or determination of suitability would
be given by the dealer. It is clear that these conditions accorded closely
with those suggested by the discount brokers. The approach of requiring
speciﬁc client acknowledgement was also similar to the manner of
regulation chosen in relation to electronic delivery of documents. On
announcing this development, the Chair of the CSA said that “this relief
from suitability obligations recognizes the changing needs of investors and

the dealer community” and that the CSA would continue to work with
the Investment Dealers Association (IDA)9 to explore similar relief for other
categories of dealers while still “safeguarding the interests of investors.” A
number of online brokerages applied for this relief from the suitability
requirements,

giving

representations

as

to

the

conditions

above

enumerated.10
The continued discussions that took place between the IDA and the CSA
in 2000 –1 about the possibility of further extending relief from the
suitability requirements to full-service brokers revolved around a number of
issues. The IDA used three main arguments to bolster its submission that
the CSA should abandon the “functional” approach – that the brokers
themselves had suggested – to regulating suitability, in favor of a “trade-bytrade” approach. These were the by-now familiar ones that: (i) other
jurisdictions, notably the U.S. and Australia, had adopted the latter model;
(ii) Canadian brokerages were being subjected to unfair competition
because of the requirement to hive off execution services to a separate
division; and (iii) broker obligations to clients would not diminish because
of this initiative (IDA 2000 –1). Indeed, the IDA asserted that it was
their clients’ initiative to seek this reform “in order to gain efﬁcient
access to the markets and their accounts” (ibid.: 15). With respect to the
competition argument, the IDA claimed that the separate divisions
requirement created an uneven playing ﬁeld for them with respect to U.S.
brokers. Because they did not have to incur these administrative costs,
clients would shift to doing business with U.S. brokers on more favorable
terms. Doing business with a U.S. broker would reduce the protection

available to Canadian clients, who could not access Canadian investorprotection funds and would ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to seek redress directly
from the broker. Meanwhile the requirement created problems for small
Canadian ﬁrms, less able to withstand the costs of establishing separate
divisions, thus having an anti-competitive effect.
With respect to the argument that client protection was not diminished
by a move to trade-by-trade determinations of suitability, the IDA’s
submission noted that the lack of transparency between two halves of the
client’s trading account could mean greater risk of lack of diversiﬁcation
overall. Clients who wished to have recommendations for some trades and
not for others would be denied the opportunity to deal with advisors of
long-standing when making execution-only trades. Furthermore, the
ﬁduciary duty owed by brokers to clients would not be diminished as a
result of this reform.11 A possibility of client confusion about the nature
of the services being offered was addressed by the IDA’s willingness to
require

member ﬁrms to

obtain client

acknowledgements

of their

understanding of the limitations of service being offered, to note whether
the trade was “recommended” or “no advice given” on the trade
conﬁrmation, and to increase its supervision and review of trading activity
to ensure appropriate compliance. This seems to be an example of
decentered regulation being proposed to bolster the case for loosening
existing restrictions, in a context of shifting understandings of investor
exposure to risk. The IDA interpreted existing Canadian case law12 as
standing for the proposition that not every client– broker relationship is
ﬁduciary and noted that clients were perfectly free not to follow the

advice of the broker, foregoing the right to complain in that instance
(IDA 2000–1: 11, 15).
In July 2001, the CSA approved the changes to the IDA bylaws and
regulations on the topic of suitability (Notice of Commission Approval
2001). The IDA’s commentary on its rule changes acknowledged that
along with concern in both Canada and the U.S. that there is no rationale
for applying the suitability rule to dealers who do not give advice to their
clients, there was a further Canadian dimension. This was “the additional
concern of the loss of brokerage business and stock exchange activity to
the U.S. in light of the rise of electronic trading, the generally lower
broker commissions offered by the U.S. discount brokers and the less
onerous suitability obligations imposed on American dealers” (IDA 2001:
2923). Furthermore, the IDA acknowledged that “compliance costs over
time will be reduced without the requirement to conduct a suitability review
for each and every transaction” (ibid.: 2924). It was also asserted that their
new policies would be in the public interest by facilitating “an efﬁcient,
fair and competitive secondary market” (ibid.: 2926). This would be
accomplished “by ensuring that investors receive the services they want
and Member ﬁrms are able to offer services similar to those available in the
U.S.” (ibid.). They should also “decrease delays that currently exist in the
industry through increased transactional efﬁciency” (ibid.). The IDA
concluded that “Investors have expressed a desire to make their own
investment decisions in respect of their assets as evidenced by the growth of
discount brokers in the industry today. Thus, investors are not looking for
a paternalistic refusal by the dealer to process an order” (ibid.: 2927).

A number of conditions for obtaining relief from suitability on a
tradeby-trade basis were imposed. These were as follows:

1. Where a ﬁrm wanted the ﬂexibility to provide recommendations or not, new
client application forms would have to request suitability information (age,
investment objectives, risk tolerance, investment knowledge, net worth,
and income) so that it could be reviewed for recommended transactions.
2. Approval for suitability relief would have to be obtained from the IDA in
accordance with its Policy No. 9. This policy, requiring disclosure of the
fact that a ﬁrm will not be responsible for making suitability
determinations when accepting an order that was not recommended is
intended to ensure that “appropriate safeguards are implemented in
order that clients will understand the differences in the types of
transactions that they wish to execute, the possible risks associated with
such transactions, and the client’s increased responsibilities when an
order-execution only transaction is requested.” This would largely be
accomplished by obtaining signed acknowledgements from clients as
to their responsibility for their own investment decisions when no
recommendation is provided. The policy also requires the disclosure to
the client to include a brief description of what does and does not
constitute a recommendation.13
3. The policy also introduced supervisory systems to ensure that clients are
not provided with recommendations where a suitability determination is
not undertaken, including accurate marking of orders as recommended or
non-recommended, monthly reviews of accounts, and trade conﬁrmations

to indicate if transaction was recommended or non-recommended.

The end result of all this, then, is that full-service brokers in Canada are
able to offer execution-only services to clients, who may opt in and out of
an advising relationship with the broker as they see ﬁt. While this
enhancement of choice for the retail investor may be interpreted as an
escape from paternalism, it also contributes to a shift in the ground rules
for the operation of an industry that had been relied upon to perform classic
intermediation and gatekeeping functions. It places more responsibility
on the industry itself to ensure that the relevant safeguards to do with
client understanding of service levels are working appropriately. In this
sense, it is possible to see this example of policy formation as exhibiting
decentered elements. Ironically, the de-emphasis on the intermediation
and ﬁduciary functions to be performed by the brokerage industry may
over time undermine the core arguments used to justify the selfregulation of the industry. Signiﬁcantly however, this example of a policy
formation process proceeded along familiar lines, with industry groups
concerned, at least in part, for their competitive position playing a pivotal
role in the way legal governance in this area was formulated.
In terms of our inquiry about risk as an element of the governance of
(investor) populations, we have noted that the imposition of suitability
requirements has always been about the management of the risk tolerance
of investors. With the introduction of execution-only services provided by
brokers in the online context, however, more of an onus is being placed on
the investor to be aware of, and to contract for, the level of suitability

assessment and advice she/he requires. Responsibility for overseeing the
procedures for managing that aspect of the broker/investor relationship is
primarily placed at the local-ﬁrm level. With these innovations, it seems
likely that basic assumptions about the level of independent decision-making
risk being assumed by retail investors in entering into the trading of
securities may change. This development, coupled with the increasing
recourse of individuals to equity markets to prepare for personal retirement
well-being, as well as the evidence from behavioral ﬁnance theorists about
the deﬁciencies of market decision-making by investors (Barber & Odean
2001), suggests that a high price might ultimately be paid by investors in
Canada for the protection of its brokerage industry from international
competition.

IV. REGULATING MARKETPLACES

An issue that goes to the core of the growth of online investing is that of
the proliferation of markets on which securities can be traded online. The
development of trading technology makes it possible for more providers to
enter the market for marketplaces. In the Canadian context, again
following suit from the U.S., regulators recently considered the issue of
what to do about so-called alternative trading systems (ATS), which
provide automated matching systems bringing together orders from
multiple buyers and sellers. In accordance with new economy imperatives,
the policy debate was conducted using discourses of competition,
efﬁciency, anonymity, choice, and cheaper information costs. However,

along with these ideas came the peculiarly Canadian concern with market
fragmentation and consequent illiquidity. What is different from the
suitability example considered above is the somewhat broader cast of
characters in relation to ATSs, which include established trading markets,
and both institutional and retail investors. Canadian imperatives for the
regulation of ATSs implicated at least two distinctive features of domestic
capital markets, the size of the Canadian market for capital relative to that
in the U.S., and the highly concentrated nature of the domestic ﬁnancial
services sector. In relation to the ﬁrst issue, regulators articulated a fear
that the advent of choices about marketplaces on which to trade securities
would result in the development of a “capital market controlled and
directed by other countries, in which only premium Canadian companies
and major-league Canadian investors will be able to participate” (Brown
1999). Thus the discourse of “the survival of an independent capital market in
Canada” and a fear of being swamped by new players with agendas not
consistent with Canadian national interests framed the policy debate
about how to regulate ATSs. With speciﬁc reference to the growth of
ATSs in the U.S., Brown noted that “Alternative trading systems are about
choice. If money managers or investors don’t have that choice, they will
take their business elsewhere.”
Regulators presented the survival of Canadian capital markets as
necessary to meet the needs of Canadian issuers and investors. However,
another relevant aspect of the context here is the economics of the
domestic ﬁnancial services sector. In November 2000, William Hess,
then the President and CEO of the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX)

noted that the trading activities of all ﬁve of the bank-owned brokers on
the Toronto Stock Exchange account for 53 percent of the TSX’s trading
volume and ten brokerage ﬁrms represent 80 percent of the TSX’s volume.
The fear articulated by the established exchanges then is as much about
losing market share to competing ATSs set up by one or more large
Canadian banks or investment dealers as it is about competitors from the
U.S. (such as Instinet or Archipelago) entering the Canadian market for
marketplaces. Added to this is what Brown describes as a measurable
growth in the “upstairs” market, that is, the practice of crossing large
blocks of shares for institutional customers off the exchange itself.
Therefore, one hypothesis about stock exchange responses to the
introduction of the new rules for the operation of ATSs is that they are
concerned to protect their own ongoing economic interests. In
preparation for the advent of competing markets, the provincial
exchanges in Canada underwent some consolidation in the late 1990s, so
that there are now three of them, the TSX for senior issuers, the TSX
Venture Exchange for junior issuers,14 and the Montreal Exchange, which
operates the only derivatives market.
In August 2001, the CSA published its ﬁnal instruments dealing with
the regulation of marketplaces and trading (NIs 21–101 and 23 –101). The
articulated goals of the rule are to “provide investor choice, improve price
discovery, and decrease execution costs.” The primary elements of these
complicated rules will be described below.

A. DEFINITIONS

The new framework to permit “the competitive operation of traditional
exchanges

and

other

marketplaces,

while

ensuring

fairness

and

transparency” begins with the deﬁnition of a marketplace. This means:
(a) an exchange; (b) a quotation and trade reporting system (QTRS);15
or (c) a person or company that (i) constitutes, maintains or provides a
market or facility for bringing together buyers and sellers of securities,
(ii) brings together orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers,
and (iii) uses established, non-discretionary methods under which orders
interact and buyers and sellers agree to trade terms.16 The key feature of a
marketplace then is the capacity to execute trades from multiple buyers and
sellers.
Meanwhile, an ATS means a marketplace that is not an exchange or
QTRS and does not: (i) require issuers to enter into agreements to have
their securities traded on the marketplace; (ii) provide a guarantee of a
two-sided market on a continuous or reasonably continuous basis; (iii) set
requirements governing the conduct of subscribers, except with respect to
trading and creditworthiness (NI 21–101 CP §3.1(3)); and (iv) does not
discipline subscribers other than by exclusion from participation in the
marketplace.
The characteristics of ATSs are established so as to draw a clear
distinction between them and organized exchanges with respect to
regulation of issuers, disciplining of members/subscribers, and a guarantee
of a market. The absence of a guarantee of a two-sided market, which
is also relevant in connection with the regulation of payments for order

ﬂow, imports some uncertainty about liquidity into the very deﬁnition of
an ATS, despite the fact that increased liquidity is one of the policy goals
of allowing ATSs to operate. Thus the regulation introduces a level of
fragmentation and complexity into the very idea of a market, which is, as
we have seen, one of the core mechanisms of neo-liberal policy. It also
facilitates a range of options for the manner in which investors may be
governed.
In order to carry on business, an ATS must: (i) be registered as a dealer;
(ii) be a member of a self-regulatory organization (SRO);17 and (iii) comply
with the provisions of NI 21–101.18 Those who may trade are called
“marketplace participants.” For an ATS, such a “participant” is called a
“subscriber,” that is, someone who has entered into a contractual
agreement with the ATS to access it “for the purpose of effecting trades or
submitting, disseminating or displaying orders on the ATS.” There is
no requirement that a subscriber be registered as a dealer, so both retail
and institutional investors could be subscribers to an ATS.19 Indeed, one
of the cited advantages of ATSs to institutional investors is that the
possibility of being able to make trades directly, as opposed to through a
dealer on the exchange, allows their trading to be more anonymous and
therefore, if it involves large blocks, to have less of an adverse impact on
pricing. Exchanges and QTRSs are not allowed to prohibit or limit
members or users from effecting transactions on any marketplace (NI 21–
101: §5.2), nor are ATSs (ibid.: §6.12). ATSs have to disclose their
trading fees to an information processor, including whether different
fees are charged to subscribers and non-subscribers. They are not

allowed to charge fees to non-subscribers such that they create barriers to
access.

B. WHAT CAN BE TRADED?

A signiﬁcant feature of the rules relating to ATSs in Canada is that, at
present, the types of securities that can be traded on them are restricted to
exchange-traded securities, corporate debt securities, government debt
securities, and foreign exchange-traded securities. An earlier version of
the rule had required only that an ATS security be a security issued by a
reporting issuer in Canada, government debt, or a security listed or quoted
on certain foreign markets. All three of the TSX, the CDNX (as it then
was), and the IDA responded to this proposal with dire warnings about
the implications of ATSs trading unlisted securities. The CDNX proposed
that by not requiring issuers to be listed on an exchange or registered with
a securities regulator “the potential for reputational damage to the
Canadian capital markets is signiﬁcant” (Hess 2000: 2). It asserted that the
ATS proposal as it existed in 1999 “allows those companies that want to
avoid scrutiny to go public outside of the closed system . . . and make a
Canadian ATS their principal or sole marketplace, while avoiding the
reporting issuer obligations in securities legislation.” The TSX was equally
concerned about the possibility of ATSs “becoming a new home for trading in
unlisted penny stocks” (Stymiest 2000: 14). In response to these views, the
CSA amended the rule so that ATSs would only be permitted to trade
the types of securities described above. This ensures that, at least in

relation to equity securities, those traded on an ATS are also traded on at
least one more senior marketplace. Another way of putting this obviously,
is to say that TSX and one or more ATS compete for orders related to
securities listed on the TSX.
However, a marketplace trading unlisted equity securities can apply for
approval from the OSC. The ﬁrst entity that sought to be regulated under
the new rules was the Canadian Trading and Quotation System (CNQ).
Regulatory approval for its operation as a QTRS was granted in March
2003. This entity is “owned by a group of private investors” and trades
non-exchange listed equity securities by approved IDA members. More
generally, the rules allow an ATS that wants to trade over-the-counter
equity securities to apply to the CSA. It may allow an ATS to trade these
securities if it is not contrary to the public interest to do so. It should be
noted, in connection with the issue of decentered regulation, that the
government regulators retained discretionary decision-making power in
relation to who could operate an online marketplace, or the terms on
which it might operate. To determine the public interest in this respect, the
CSA “look at a number of factors including whether there are appropriate
arrangements for issuer regulation” (Notice of National Instruments,
Companion Policies and Forms: 91). Thus, adequate arrangements for
regulation are central to the determination to allow a marketplace to
operate.

C. GROUND RULES FOR MARKET OPERATION

All marketplaces are subject to requirements about information consolidation,
market integration requirements, reporting/record-keeping requirements,
and systems-capacity requirements. The information consolidation and
market integration rules are an attempt to “preserve the beneﬁts of a
centralized market” (Kerbel and Wade 1999: 2), in the sense that
information will be available to subscribers as to the prices at which
securities are trading on other markets. Originally, the information
transparency provisions would have required all marketplaces that display
orders of exchange-traded securities or foreign exchange-traded securities
to provide information on these orders to a data consolidator by
December 2003 (NI 21–101: §7).20 In the meantime, marketplaces were
required to provide details of all trades to an information vendor, which
could be any one of a number of entities, such as the TSX or Reuters.
This order and trade information must be provided to the information
vendor in real-time or as close to real-time as possible. Before the rule was
implemented, these transparency requirements were criticized by a number
of industry participants on the ground of their cost to the industry and
investors. Since then, the implementation of the requirement to provide
information to a data consolidator has been delayed pending further
investigation of the need for, and the appropriate extent of, information
transparency requirements by an industry committee. In the meantime,
an information vendor is expected to meet requirements imposed by a
regulation services provider with respect to “the process, the business
content of the reporting and regulatory data feeds, including the core data

elements, the message catalogue and the service level standards”
(Amendments to NI 21–101 CP: §1.1 (8)).
Meanwhile, the market integration rules, which are designed to allow
access to the orders displayed by the information processor, were intended
to be introduced in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, to last until 1 January
2004, marketplaces could not execute trades of securities unless they had
an “electronic connection” to the “principal market” for the security. The
principal market would be identiﬁed by the information processor, “following
the enactment of the Instrument and each year” (NI 21–101 CP: §11.1(3))
as “the marketplace that had the largest trading volume for that security in that
calendar year.” The connection to the principal market allows subscribers
to an ATS to access orders in that market, if not in all marketplaces trading
that security. The implication of this, of course, is that unregistered ATS
subscribers, i.e., retail or institutional investors, could trade securities listed
on the TSX without the intervention of a broker. This is particularly likely
to be the case in the ﬁrst period of operation of this system, since the
principal market, at least initially, is the TSX. The other implication
though is that during this transition phase, subscribers could see better
offers from marketplaces other than the principal market, but were not
able to access them directly. This suggests that fulﬁlling the goal of
equal access to the best price available will take some time to be
accomplished.21

D. REGULATION OF ATSs

A signiﬁcant feature of the rule is that, as well as providing for the
development of new marketplaces giving investors additional choices,
marketplaces themselves also have choice about how they will be
regulated. The options they may choose among are to be regulated as: (i) a
member of an exchange; (ii) as an exchange; or (iii) as an ATS. An ATS
will not be expected to discipline its subscribers or establish listing
requirements for issuers. The approach of allowing choices among forms
and intensity of regulation suggests that, as neo-liberal thinking would
have it, regulation itself is being increasingly fragmented along with the
markets, such that the intensity of regulation will vary among entities
performing similar trading functions.
National Instrument 23–101 sets out a number of minimum requirements
as to how trading on all marketplaces is to be conducted. The substance of
this instrument deals with prohibitions on manipulation and fraud in
trading practices,22 the application of trading halts,23 best execution
requirements, and establishment of trading hours. ATSs are exempt from
the best execution requirements. More generally, marketplaces are exempt
from the application of these rules if they comply with rules and policies
established by a recognized exchange, a recognized QTRS, or a
“regulation services provider,” whose rules will be reviewed and
approved by the regulators. Other substantive provisions in an earlier
version of this rule dealing with issues such as short selling, insider
trading of securities of foreign nonreporting issuers, front running, an
order exposure rule, and principal trading have been omitted altogether

from the ﬁnal version of the trading rules, and have been delegated down
to regulation services providers to handle. This seems to suggest a level
of decentering in relation to regulating the ongoing market activities of
ATSs. The CSA will “review its proposed rules to determine if these
provisions are included and whether the speciﬁc provisions

are

appropriate in the context of that market, marketplace or security.”
The

logic

here

is that

“identical

provisions

are

not

necessarily

appropriate for each type of market, marketplace or each type of security.”
This delegation down of the regulation-setting function may allow for the
possibility of different trading rules for different marketplaces (and
consequent possible confusion for investors), and also might require
marketplaces to change their regulation depending on the type of
security that trades there.24 Exchanges and QTRSs may either govern the
conduct of their members/users directly, or by agreement with a regulation
services provider. The Companion Policy to NI 23 –101 indicates that the
regulators expect marketplace participants to transact business “openly
and fairly and in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade (NI
23–101 CP: §1.2).” Meanwhile, as we have seen, ATSs cannot carry on
business unless they are registered as dealers, are members of an SRO, and
comply with NIs 21–101 and 23–101. ATSs have to keep subscribers’
trading information conﬁdential, including the identity of subscribers and
their orders unless the subscriber otherwise consents, or the information is
required by law to be released (such as, presumably, insider reporting
rules). They are required to provide risk disclosure to subscribers who are
not dealers, to the effect that they do not ensure best execution for

subscribers. Subscribers are required to acknowledge that they have
received this disclosure before their ﬁrst order is traded (NI 21–101:
§6.11). Signiﬁcantly, ATSs are required to enter into a contract with a
“regulation services provider” that will set requirements for ATS trading,
monitor the trading activities of the ATS and its subscribers, and enforce
its own rules (NI 23–101: §8.2). The regulatory body for an ATS has to
be recognized by the OSC before any ATS can start trading. The recordkeeping requirements for marketplaces are found in Part 11 of NI 21–101.
ATSs also have to enter into agreements with their subscribers that the
latter will comply with the requirements of the regulation services
provider. This arrangement also appears to be consistent with neo-liberal
modes of governing through decentralized contractual agreements rather
than the content of regulation being centrally imposed by the government
regulator. Indeed the very language of “regulation services provider,” used
for the ﬁrst time in Canadian securities regulation, turns on its head the
notion of regulation as a set

of

authoritative

pronouncements from a

centralized power and implies that “regulation services” are themselves
another commodity to be bought and sold in the market. Again there is
evidence of an increasing fragmentation of regulatory systems as well as of
markets. However, the state regulators have retained the power to oversee the
activities of regulation services providers, by way of, for example,
requiring periodic reporting of their regulatory activities, approval of
“signiﬁcant changes” in the way regulation services are provided, and
reporting of market misconduct if investors may suffer “serious damage” or
there are grounds to believe fraud may be involved, as well as notiﬁcation

of “material systems failures and changes25 (In the Matter of Market
Regulation Services 2002: 925).
A speciﬁc regulatory issue that caused some controversy among
commentators on the CSA’s draft rules in relation to ATSs was that of
payment for order ﬂow. The TSX wanted the CSA to prohibit this in its
trading rules, on the basis that if ATSs were allowed to pay for order
ﬂow, this would create “a clear conﬂict of interest for ﬁrms routing client
orders . . . based on ﬁnancial beneﬁts to the brokerage ﬁrm rather than . . .
best execution.” On the other hand, the Investment Dealers Association,
some of whose members might potentially establish ATSs themselves,
“strongly oppose[d] a ban on payment for order ﬂow or preferencing.” It
argued that this would be anti-competitive, and the problem of conﬂict of
interest could be adequately handled through a best-execution rule
combined with monitoring by the relevant SRO. Ultimately the CSA took
refuge in the idea that once “one party guarantees execution for a price,
they have provided a guarantee of liquidity. Consequently that party must
be recognized as an exchange.” As we have seen there is no best
execution requirement for ATSs, only intermediaries. Similarly, an
earlier version of the ATS rule would have prohibited owners of an
ATS or their afﬁliates from trading securities on the ATS for their own
account. This was apparently designed to prevent dealers with large
volumes of trading from withdrawing from exchanges and setting up
their own ATSs for their customers. This prohibition has disappeared
from the ﬁnal version of the rule. The implications here, obviously, are
that an ATS could potentially trade for itself as a buyer or seller, in the

absence of any best execution requirement.

E. ENTER MARKET REGULATION SERVICES INC.

As might be predicted by a scholar of decentering, the model of instituting a
“regulation services provider” to regulate trading in an ATS was considered
preferable to direct regulation by the CSA or to regulation of an ATS by
the TSX, likely to be an ATS competitor and therefore not acceptable to
them as a regulator. However the TSX moved quickly to, as it were,
capture the market for regulation by establishing a company called Market
Regulation Services Inc. (RS), which it jointly owns with the IDA. The
TSX and TSX Venture have retained RS as their regulation services
provider with the approval of securities regulators, and RS has been
approved as an SRO in ﬁve provinces, including Ontario. The hope of RS’s
owners is that it will be retained to provide similar services to other
marketplaces. As the rules require that regulation services providers must
be SROs, it is likely that this may occur. According to Tom Atkinson,
the CEO of RS (Blackwell & Dixon 2001: B2), “a few [ATSs]” approached
RS about providing regulatory services soon after its inception. These
include CNQ, which began operating in summer 2003, and which has
retained RS to provide it with market surveillance and regulatory oversight
services.
The recognition order granted to RS by the government regulator in
January 2002 includes terms and conditions in relation to corporate
governance, fees chargeable, access of ATSs to RS’s services, ﬁnancial

viability, systems capacity, as well as the rule-making and discipline
exercisable by RS. Thus it is arguable that a relatively detailed template of
internal organization and ongoing operation has been provided to RS by
the regulators. For example, RS is required to have a board where at least
50 percent of its directors are “independent,” as deﬁned in the order,
and where “at all times,” at least one of its directors represents ATSs. It
is not allowed to “unreasonably prohibit or limit access to its regulation
services.” In relation to ﬁnancial viability, RS is required to operate on
a not-for-proﬁt basis, and to have a “risk management policy that will
allow it to identify issues that may prevent it from allocating sufﬁcient
ﬁnancial and other resources to carry out its regulation functions in a
manner that is consistent with the public interest.” Its fee structure is
composed of a relatively modest ﬁxed annual fee chargeable to
“participating organizations” of TSX or TSX Venture or ATS subscribers,
and a variable fee per shares traded. New marketplaces are also charged a
one-time fee for providing them with a connection to RS’s systems. Its
rules, which must be ﬁled with regulators, are required to be “not
contrary” to the public interest and to ensure compliance with securities
legislation, prevent fraud, and promote just and equitable principles of trade.
In an early news release, Atkinson described RS as Canada’s ﬁrst
“independent and national market regulator.” RS’s mission is described
as being to “develop, administer, surveil, and enforce market integrity
rules applicable to trading in Canadian securities markets in a neutral, cost
effective, service oriented and responsive manner that does not preference
one type of market over another.” The TSX and TSX Venture have

promulgated a set of Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIRs), which
are being used by RS to regulate the markets for which it is the
regulation services provider. These rules apply to the operation of
marketplaces (such as order entry, transaction record, and trading halt
rules), participants26 (including conduct of business in accordance with just
and equitable principles of trade, prohibition against short selling, and
front running), and access persons. In August 2002, RS published a set
of sanction guidelines for its disciplinary proceedings, indicating the range
of monetary and other sanctions that would be applied for breach of
UMIRs provisions.
In a recent interview, Atkinson repeated a view that he expressed when
RS was ﬁrst established, to the effect that “Enforcement is probably the
least effective form of enhancing market integrity” (Tedesco 2003: FP6).
The same source reports that “during its inaugural year, RS has issued
300,000 alerts to traders for possible rule violations; it has vetted over
40,000 corporate press releases and on average, monitored 110,000 trades a
day.” It has also made a request to the CSA for “sweeping powers, among
them the ability to subpoena witnesses, to compel individuals and companies
to co-operate during investigations and to appear before a disciplinary
panel; and enable them to collect on the ﬁnancial penalties resulting from
disciplinary action.”
It is worth noting that the model adopted here, where a provider
contracts to provide regulation services to a market, results in the
regulator being functionally detached from the market. This detachment
has been something for which state regulators were regularly criticized.

The model adopted here is clearly something of a “third way,” in that it is
neither state nor self-regulation as these have been generally understood.
Is it decentered? The commodiﬁcation of regulatory power implied in this
model does suggest a destabilizing of the state command-and-control
model. However, the fact that in practice, the TSX and IDA are currently
the owners of the regulation services provider27 suggests that the model in
Ontario is in fact closer to self-regulation, with theoretical competition
among regulators for the business of regulating markets providing a
“new

economy”

spin. These established interests appear to have

maintained their inﬂuence over a regulatory process designed to promote
broader competition, new players, and greater choice for online investors.

V. CONCLUSION

The evidence presented here reafﬁrms the point that if the growth of online
investing is associated with neo-liberal competition and entrepreneurship
among market providers and intermediaries, competition is also being
managed by regulatory processes (Braithwaite 2000). In terms of our
empirical inquiry into whether the approach to regulating online investing
in Canada exhibits a commitment to decentering the state, the results can
be described as somewhat

mixed.

On the

one

hand,

delegating

responsibility to individual brokerage ﬁrms for monitoring the operation of
suitability disclosure in relation to online transactions and allowing issuers
ﬂexibility about the presentation of Internet-based prospectus material

suggests a minimal role for state regulation. Adopting a market model
of regulatory structure in relation to ATSs – by way of the innovation
of the “regulation services provider” – seems to be the clearest example
of decentering the state. On the other hand, this market model is
accompanied by a relatively robust system of state oversight. Similarly,
we have noted that a generally conservative approach has been taken in
Canada to the use of the Internet for document delivery and disclosure. In
this sense, Braithwaites’ observation that the role of government in the
“new regulatory state” is to regulate the standards of private-sector service
providers is demonstrably reinforced (ibid.: 226). But while it is clear that
the form and nature of the regulatory strategies being employed in the
online investing sphere are becoming more variable and multi-institutional,
the evidence does not appear to support the more radical proposition that
“authority itself” is being devolved (ibid.: 228). In particular, the
phenomenon of using investing technology itself to do the regulating,
which might be considered the pinnacle of an embedded approach to the
regulation of online investing, is not yet a pervasive feature (Black 2001:
138).
The other prong of our inquiry – empirical evidence of a shift to risk
governance as a modality of regulating – has again produced ambiguous
results, in the sense that “risk knowledges” appear to be selectively
mobilized (Valverde, Levi & Moore 2003). While the capacity for online
brokers to offer execution-only services to investors might well be
construed as a

redistribution

of

the

risk

of

making

investment

decisions from intermediaries to customers, when the context shifts to

the delivery of issuer documents, regulators were reluctant to engage in a
similar redistribution. The marketizing of the regulatory apparatus for
ATSs suggests that individual and institutional investors might have to
factor in the credibility of the regulatory structure in making decisions
about where to trade. Investors will increasingly be contracting for
regulatory effectiveness as part of making investment choices. The absence
of a best-execution requirement for ATSs may increase the level of risk
incurred by investors choosing an ATS as their trading platform. Yet
discourses

of

risk

and

risk

management

appear to be

targeted

predominantly at individual investors rather than more established industry
players. The approach to setting ground rules for the operation of ATSs
could be interpreted in terms of regulators managing the risks of their
arrival by way of rules about what can be traded, transparency
obligations, and, signiﬁcantly, requirements for regulatory services. Yet, it
is apparent that the emerging regulation of ATSs in Canada is also
oriented around traditional legal discourses of avoiding conﬂicts of interest in
the operation of new markets or even public choice discourses about
accommodating the ongoing economic interests of established institutional
entities. What the case of regulating online investing in the Canadian
context does seem to make clear, however, is the need to pay careful
attention to the politics of decentering and risk governance. The absence
of individual investor voices in debates about how to regulate in this ﬁeld
is notable. The decentering impulse driving both the online suitability
assessment issue and the regulation of ATSs was clearly connected to the
economic interests of repeat players in the ﬁeld, such as investment banks

with online brokerage subsidiaries, as well as the TSX and IDA, the
owners of RS. In relation to risk governance, this case study provides
scope for an argument that while individual investors might be
increasingly

governed

through

this

modality, with online trading

technology being interpreted as a source of risk to them, institutional
entities like brokerage houses or new marketplaces are given more
autonomy about whether or not, or how, to engage with discourses of
risk management. In other words, it remains important to explore the
political

conditions

under

which

risk

discourses

are

mobilized

(McCluskey 2002; Valverde Levi & Moore 2003). Given these realities,
there is room for skepticism that the online investing context will produce a
signiﬁcantly greater degree of investment market democracy in Canada.
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NOTES

1. Securities regulation in Canada is provincial, so that provincial regulators make
regulation and policy affecting that province only. However, an umbrella
organization called the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) has over
the last few years attempted to promote a harmonized approach to Canadian
securities regulation by promulgating “national instruments” or “national

policies” that may be adopted as rule or policy in individual provinces.
2. Kingsford Smith provides an insightful account of the development of this
perspective in her paper in this volume. See also Black (2001).
3. Thus, these information sheets contain comments such as “If you are
considering an online investing opportunity, keep in mind that the Internet is
unregulated . . . just because information is available doesn’t necessarily mean
it’s true” (Beware of Internet Investing: Scams); “While computers can speed up
the trading process, don’t make the mistake of thinking trades happen instantly”
and “While trading on margin may magnify the size of your returns, it is risky
because it also magniﬁes the size of any losses” (Thinking of Investing Online?);
“Investors who venture into the online world . . . should keep in mind that the
power of the Internet is also being exploited by investment con artists and
fastbuck operators who want nothing more than to separate you from your
hard earned money” (Investing and the Internet – Be Alert to Signs of Fraud).
4. In Canada, the document that provides this information to investors is known
as a prospectus.
5. Thus “where delivery is intended by posting a document, such as on the Internet,
the notice requirement could be satisﬁed by providing notice to each intended
recipient at the time that a document is available or by obtaining the recipient’s
prior informed consent to this form of delivery” (Requests for Comments 1999:
7786). As to evidence of delivery, the CSA view is that “the best form of evidence
of electronic delivery is proof that a document was sent electronically in
accordance with the terms of the prior consent of the recipient” (ibid.: 7788).
6. This is the term used to describe the permissible limits of information about the
business entity and the security being offered that can be provided to potential
investors by investment bankers in advance of the prospectus being approved by
regulators.

7. Charles Schwab Canada was purchased in 2002 by Bank of Nova Scotia.
8. These are now to be found in Rules 31–505 (Conditions of Registration) and 31–
502 (Proﬁciency Requirements).
9. The IDA is the main self-regulatory organization for brokers and dealers in
Canada.
10. They undertook to continue to adhere to the suitability requirements for those
clients from whom an acknowledgement was not obtained for a six-month
period following the date of the application decision. However, some were
required to make applications to extend this period for a further six months in
order to have additional time to obtain the client acknowledgments.
11. A concern expressed by the CSA that there could be a conﬂict of interest
resulting from referral payments made by order-execution only brokers to their
fellow broker-advisors was dismissed by the IDA as “unrealistic” and “contrary
to the successful operation of an individual broker’s full-service business.”
12. Notably Varcoe v Sterling 1992.
13. Here an IDA notice to members indicates that making “investment
information” (e.g. news, research, opinions, asset allocation models, portfolio
tracking information, public disclosure documents, etc.) available to one or more
customers would not constitute a recommendation provided that a proposal is
not “individually tailored for the particular customer or class of customers.”
Related to this, if a customer “sets out the parameters of the types of
investment information that he or she wishes to receive,” providing that
information would not be considered a recommendation. On the other hand,
systems for “data mining” customers’ habits and investment preferences based
on past investment decisions and using this to target investment-related
information to those customers might constitute a recommendation. A
recommendation might also be involved where the broker held herself out as

taking into account the customer’s objectives and ﬁnancial situation in relation
to a transaction.
14. This used to be the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX) until it was acquired
by the TSX in 2001.
15. This is a person or company other than an exchange or registered dealer, that
operates facilities permitting the dissemination of price quotations for the
purchase and sale of securities and reports of completed transactions in
securities for the exclusive use of registered dealers.
16. Such non-discretionary methods include rules imposing execution priorities, e.g.,
time and price priority rules. A person or company brings together orders for
securities if it displays trading interests entered on the system or receives orders
centrally for processing and execution (NI 21–101 CP: §2.1(3)).
17. The requirement of membership in an SRO is intended to ensure that investors
are protected by the Canadian Investor Protection Fund as well as SRO
regulations

about

capital

requirements

for

members.

The

regulation

acknowledged that at this time the only SRO available for an ATS to join
was the IDA, the SRO for brokers and dealers. Unlike the TSX, the IDA
does not operate a market itself. TSX member regulation functions were
recently transferred to the IDA, in connection with the demutualization of the
Exchange.
18. Section 6.7 of the instrument requires an ATS to notify the regulators if its
trading volumes or dollar values of any “type of security” are equal to or greater
than 20 percent of all value or volume in that type of security on all
marketplaces in Canada. Once those thresholds of “market dominance” are
reached, the regulators will consider whether the ATS is more appropriately
considered to be an exchange, even if it is not performing the functions that
distinguish an exchange from an ATS, such as listing issuers or disciplining
members.

19. The structure of the registration requirements for securities trading is such that
investors generally are only exempt from them if they “trade through an agent
who is a registered dealer.” This is accomplished by the ATS being designated
as a dealer for some purposes.
20. Marketplaces have to provide at least information on the type, the issuer, the
class, the symbol and the series of the security, the ﬁve best bid prices and ﬁve
best ask prices for each security displayed, and the total disclosed volume at each
of those prices.
21. Beyond January 2004, marketplaces were to be required to have agreements with
a market integrator and to comply with its requirements, or if none exists, they
were to “establish and maintain electronic connection to all other marketplaces
trading the same securities.” The companion policy to the rule indicates that
“Phase 2 integration will establish more complete market integration and order
routing between all marketplaces in order to ensure that there will be price
protection for all orders between all competing marketplaces” (NI 21–101 CP:
§11.1(5)). So ATSs would at this point have to take responsibility for facilitating
the access of their subscribers to all marketplaces trading the same securities. It
should be noted of course that there is no requirement to automatically route
orders to the best priced market, since ATSs have no duty of best execution (NI
23–101, Part 4). The CSA would have considered an ATS not to be in
compliance with this access requirement if it responded to orders from nonparticipants more slowly than from its own participants, or it used different
technology that did not provide equivalent service to execute non-participant
orders, or it charged fees which had the effect of creating a barrier to access
for non-marketplace participants. Again there was criticism of this requirement
by industry participants on the ground of the cost and complexity involved in
achieving connectivity. The CSA has now, as of January 2004, backed away from
the more robust requirement for market integration, by deleting the concept of

“market integrator” in the rules. Instead the focus will be on “ensuring
compliance with best execution requirements for dealers and fair access
requirements for marketplaces” (Notice of Proposed Amendments to NI 21–
101: 4379).
22. These include: wash trading or effecting transactions that have the effect of
artiﬁcially raising/lowering or maintaining prices. See NI 23–101 CP: §3.1.
23. Here the idea is that if one marketplace halts trading in a particular security, no
other marketplace can trade it either.
24. For example, if a marketplace began trading foreign non-reporting issuer
securities.
25. For an example of the terms of an “oversight program,” see the Memorandum
of Understanding regarding oversight of Market Regulation Services Inc.
between the Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, Manitoba, and Ontario
Securities Commissions.
26. These are members of an exchange or dealers operating on an ATS, but not
those who are merely “subscribers” to an ATS.
27. An example of the complex relationship between RS and at least one of its
owners, the TSX, is an issue that caused some controversy among those
interested parties that commented on the proposed structure and operation
of RS before its approval by the regulators. This was the fact that the TSX
charges RS for the use of its surveillance systems, which may then be used by
RS to surveil markets other than the TSX. RS agreed to investigate the cost
of obtaining comparable services from a third party.

REFERENCES

Anand, Anita Indira (2001) “Securities Law in the Internet Age: Is ‘Regulating by
Analogy’ the Right Approach?,” Queens Law Journal 27: 129 – 60.
Bank of Montreal Investor Services Ltd., CIBC Investor Services Inc., CT Securities
Inc., Green Line Investor Services, Hongkong Bank Discount Trading Inc., Priority
Brokerage Inc., Royal Bank Action Direct Inc., Scotia Discount Brokerage Inc.,
Sun Life Securities Inc., VERSUS Brokerage Services Inc. (1998) “Re: Suitability
Rules.” Submission to Canadian Securities Regulators, 1 October.
Barber, Brad M., and Terrance Odean (2001) “Boys Will Be Boys: Gender,
Overconﬁdence and Common Stock Investment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
116: 261–92.
Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage
Publications.
Beck, Ulrich (2000) “Risk Society Revisited: Theory, Politics and Research
Programmes.” In The Risk Society and Beyond, edited by B. Adam, U. Beck & J.
Van Loon. London: Sage Publications.
Black, Julia (2001) “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation
and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World,” Current Legal Problems 54:
103 – 46.
Blackwell, Richard, and Guy Dixon (2001) “Brokerage Proﬁts tumble,” Globe and
Mail December 8: B2.
Bradley, Caroline (2004) “Online Financial Information: Law and Technological
Change,” Law & Policy 26: 375– 409.
Braithwaite, John (2000) “The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of
Criminology,” British Journal of Criminology 40: 222–38.
Brown, David A. (1999) “Present At the Creation: New Century, New Trading Systems.”

Address to the Canadian Club, 12 April, OSC Bulletin. 22: 2252.
Callinicos, Alex (1999) “Social Theory Put to the Test of Politics: Pierre Bourdieu
and Anthony Giddens,” New Left Review 236: 77–102.
Canadian Securities Association (CSA) (2000) “CSA Provides Relief from Suitability
Obligations,” News Release. OSC Bulletin. 23: 2683.
Castells, Manuel (2000) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1,
The Rise of the Network Society, 2d ed. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
Coffee, John C., Jr. (1997) “Brave New World?: The Impact of the Internet on
Modern Securities Regulation,” The Business Lawyer 52: 1195 –233.
Condon, Mary (1998) Making Disclosure. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
Condon, Mary (2002) “Privatizing Pension Risk: Gender, Law and Financial Markets.”
In Privatization, Law and the Challenge of Feminism, edited by B. Cossman &
J. Fudge. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
Dean, Mitchell (1999) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London:
Sage Publications.
Economy and Society (2001) Economy and Society 30(4): 399–564.
Ericson, Richard, and Kevin Haggerty (1997) Policing the Risk Society. Toronto:
Univ. of Toronto Press.
Hawkins, Keith, and John Thomas (1989) Making Regulatory Policy. Pittsburgh:
Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.
Hess, William L. (2000) “Republication of Proposed National Instruments 21–101,
23 –101 and Related Documents (Marketplace Operation Rule and Trading Rules)
– the ‘Proposal.’ Comment of the Canadian Venture Exchange, October 19. Toronto:
Ontario

Securities

Commission.

Available

at

http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/Rules/ATS_comments_0007
28.html (accessed 8 July 2003).
Investment Dealers Association (IDA) (2000–1) Submission to the Canadian Securities
Association on Relief from Suitability Requirements.

Investors Dealers Association (IDA) (2001) Proposed By-Laws to Provide Trade-by
Trade Relief from the Suitability Requirement OSC Bulletin. 24: 2923.
Kerbel, Jeff, and Catherine Wade (1999) “CSA Propose National Instrument to
Regulate Alternative Trading Systems and Other Marketplaces,” Blake, Cassels
and Graydon Securities Rules Alert 46 (July).
Kingford Smith, Dimity (2004) “Beyond the Rule of Law? Decentered Regulation in
Online Investing”, Law & Policy 26: 439–76.
Market Probe Canada (2000) The 2000 Canadian Shareowners Study. 29 May.
Toronto: Toronto Stock Exchange.
Market Probe Canada (2002) The 2002 Canadian Shareowners Study. 23 August.
Toronto: Toronto Stock Exchange.
Market Regulation Services (2001) “A message from Tom Atkinson, President &
CEO Market Regulation Services Inc.” News release, 7 December.
McCluskey, Martha T. (2002) “Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution of Social
Insurance.” In Embracing Risk, edited by T. Baker & J. Simon. Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press.
O’Malley, Pat, Lorna Weir, and Clifford Shearing (1997) “Governmentality,
Criticism, Politics,” Economy and Society 26: 501–17.
Rose, Nikolas (1999) Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press.
Scott, Colin (2001) “Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and
Institutional Design,” Public Law 2001: 329–53.
Stymeist, Barbara (2000) Re: Proposal to Regulate Alternative Trading Systems.
Comment of the Toronto Stock Exchange, 19 October. Toronto: Ontario Securities
Commission. Available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Regulation/Rulemaking/
Rules/ATS_comments_000728.html (accessed 8 July 2003).
Tedesco, Theresa (2003) “TSX Offshoot Taking on Role of National Market

Regulator.” Financial Post, 3 March, FP6.
Valverde, Mariana, Ron Levi, and Dawn Moore (2003) Legal Knowledges of Risks.
Report to the Law Commission of Canada, 2 June.
Wetston, Howard I. (1999) “Remarks to Canadian Investors Securitization
Conference.” 8–9 November, OSCB 22: 7093.
Wetston, Howard I. (2000) “Bringing Regulation Into Line With Reality: A
Regulatory Perspective on a Changing World.” Speech in Ottawa, 5 April. OSC
Bulletin 23: 2875.

CASES CITED

Varcoe v Sterling (1992), 7 OR (3d) 204 (Ont Gen Div).

LEGAL MATERIALS CITED

Amendments to National Instrument 21–101 Marketplace Operation (2004) 27
OSCB 456.
Companion Policy 21–101CP (Marketplace Operation), (2001) 24 OSCB (Supp) 182.
Companion Policy 23 –101CP (Trading Rules), (2001) 24 OSCB (Supp) 206.
In the Matter of Market Regulation Services Inc. Recognition Order, (2002) 25
OSCB 924.
National Instrument 21–101 (Marketplace Operation), (2001) 24 OSCB (Supp) 136.
National Instrument 23 –101 (Trading Rules), (2001) 24 OSCB (Supp) 198.
National Policy 11–201 (Delivery of Documents by Electronic Means), (1999) 22
OSCB 8163.
National Policy 47–201 (Trading Securities Using the Internet and Other Electronic
Means), (2000) 22 OSCB 8062.

National Policy 51–201 (Disclosure Standards), (2002) 25 OSCB 4492.
Notice of Commission Approval-Amendment to IDA Regulations 1300, 1800.5 and
1900.4 and IDA Policy No. 9 – Suitability Requirements, (2001) 24 OSCB 4513.
Notice of National Instruments, Companion Policies and Forms – Regulation of
Marketplace and Trading, (2001) 24 OSCB (Supp) 85.
Notice of National Policy 11–201 (Delivery of Documents By Electronic Means),
(1999) 22 OSCB 8156.
Notice of National Policy 51–201 (Disclosure Standards and Proposed Rescission of
National Policy 40 Timely Disclosure), (2002) 25 OSCB 4459.
Notice of Proposed Amendments to National Instrument 21–101 Marketplace
Operation and Companion Policy 21–101CP, (2003) 26 OSCB 4377.
Notice of Proposed National Instrument 33 –103 Distribution Networks, (1997) 20
OSCB 6280.
Request for Comments (1999) National Policy 11–201 (Delivery of Documents by
Electronic Means) 21 OSCB 7782.
Request for Comments (2001) Notice of Proposed National Policy 51–201
(Disclosure Standards and Proposed Rescission of National Policy 40 Timely
Disclosure), (2001) 24 OSCB 3301.
Rule 31–502 (Proﬁciency Requirements), (2000) 23 OSCB 5658.
Rule 31–505 (Conditions of Registration), (1999) 22 OSCB 731.

